Awkwardly included: Portugal and Indonesia’s politics of multi-culturalism in East Timor, 1942 to the early 1990s

Kisho Tsuchiya

Abstract—This article explores the history of East Timor from 1942 to the early 1990s, examining how ideological tolerance of racial and cultural diversity functioned as a state policy under Portuguese and Indonesian regimes to limit the appeal of separatist movements. The Portuguese policy shift towards multi-racialism in the middle of the 20th century reflected their experiences of Timorese hostility during the Pacific War and the rise of international anti-colonialism in the post-war period. Portuguese multi-racialism (1951-74) justified their “European” presence in Asia and Africa, and it resulted in the promotion of Portuguese citizenship among the Timorese. The Indonesian rule of East Timor from 1976 used the rhetoric of “unity in diversity” and racial commonality to weaken the ground of East Timorese separatism. This was sufficiently effective to marginalize international dissent into the late 1980s. In so doing, Indonesia utilized the Pan-Timorese sentiment which the Portuguese suppressed while excluding the “new Portuguese” from East Timor. East Timorese ethno-nationalism gained momentum only when Indonesia’s atrocity was exposed through the Western media in 1991 and East Timorese activists adopted the language of human-rights, the dominant ideology of the post-Cold War age. The conclusion of this paper is that East Timorese identity politics have been characterized by the experiences of those multiple layers of being included and excluded under the Portuguese and Indonesian policies.

Keywords: East Timor, Portugal, Indonesia, diversity, identity, post-colonialism.
From the first day of its misfortune in the presence of unexpected situations (of the Pacific War), Timor knew how to add a glorious page to the History of Portugal through the Portuguese who inhabited there, the natives or those from other provinces, without distinction of race or creed. (Sarmento Rodrigues, minister of overseas provinces of Portugal, 1952; N.A. 1952)

After all, we are of the same color of skin, and shared the same history of Majapahit Empire. None of the Indonesian people will reject a merger of it (Portuguese Timor)! (Djaelani Naro, the vice president of the Indonesian House of Representatives, 1974; Tempo 1974)

All the globally competitive U.S., corporations are all-out for multi-culturalism, multi-ethnic staff, a world without borders and the latest high technology no matter what its impact on human beings, something evident in their media advertising. (Bruce Cumings 1997)

This article examines the historical role of multi-culturalism as a state ideology in the case of East Timor (previously Portuguese Timor and the Indonesian province of Timor Timur), where the two external governments of Lisbon and Jakarta promoted a certain tolerance of diversity to cut down the value of local separatism. Following Karl Mannheim’s idea of “total ideology,” it juxtaposes anti-colonialism, multi-racialism, multi-culturalism, regionalism, nationalism, human-rights, and other ideologies as collective patterns of reality cognition of a certain age or groups, rather than simply false cognition (Mannheim 1954, 49-62). In Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, all structures of knowledge are ideological in the sense that they contain truths but they also simplify complex reality based on the knowledge-producing groups’ unique encounters with reality.

Contemporary knowledge of East Timor in the Anglophone world has been produced by the post-Cold War ideology of human-rights and self-determination. Due to this, academic criticisms of the historical actors in East Timor have been directed against violence, Portuguese “colonialism” and the Indonesian “third world colonialism” that suppressed East Timorese nationalism (Carey 1996; Weldemichael 2013). To paraphrase Mannheim, such criticism itself has been framed by other ideological soils of diversity, nationalism, and human-rights.
Thus, critics of East Timor’s historical rulers have remained uncritical of the role of their own analytical categories and their potential obscuring of reality. Being ignorant of our own ideological soil and its origin, we tend to consider the distant “colonial past” as something that has “passed” and remain ignorant of the problems that characterize the present.

In addition, the concept of “third world colonialism” has provided little analytical utility in the case of East Timor. If our lesson from East Timor’s experience only regards the colonialist/colonized antagonism, we will have learned little of its history of ideology. Rather, the criticism of “colonialism” from a nationalist perspective can reinforce exactly the Suharto regime’s ideology that justified the occupation of East Timor, remembering that it was legitimized as a liberation of Indonesian people (the East Timorese were presumed to be part of the broader Indonesian nation in propaganda) from European colonial rule. More importantly, this type of argument managed to silence most of the international audience until 1991, when the Santa Cruz Massacre was visually exposed by the Western media (Fernandes 2011; Gunderson 2015). In other words, both the Indonesian occupation and its critics justified their stances through the ideology of anti-colonialism and self-determination.

In addition, although the concept of “third world colonialism” visualizes the post-colonial nations’ imperialism outside their territorial borders, it conceals the problems within the territory and around the borderlands. It accepts the territorial borders that were demarcated by the colonial powers as a given condition. To understand the governmentality of the post-colonial states, we need to understand how the authorities differentiated their ideologies from classical European colonialism (Foucault 1991).

Against this backdrop, the present author acknowledges the necessity of a discourse analysis of multiculturalism and self-determination from a perspective that is outside these ideological soils. By comparing the Portuguese and Indonesian ideologies and local policies, this article provides a preliminary survey of the unique Timorese experiences of being excluded and included in the rights and obligations of multiple external rulers. The focus is the politics of inclusion by the external rulers. If identities are the results of experienced social ties that bind (and bound), the Timorese people had the opportunity to compare the Dutch, Portuguese, Japanese, Indonesian and Timorese rulers in
colonial and post-colonial settings (Tilly 2005, ch. 1 and 207-209). Indeed, they were categorized as “colonial natives,” “Portuguese,” “Indonesian” and “East Timorese.” The successive experiences with various colonial policies and citizenships were crucial in the making of their layered and complex identities. Although this article confines its narrative to the period from the 1940s to the early 1990s, research should be extended to broader periods in the future.

The problematical element engaged in this paper is the government’s power to arbitrarily change the location of the social border between “Portuguese” and “non-Portuguese,” or “Indonesian” and “non-Indonesian” according to their convenience (Oguma 1998, 634-640). Of course, the ruled subjects were not given the right to determine what kind of Portuguese, Indonesian, East Timorese, United Timorese, anarchist or apolitical villagers they wanted to be. They could either be excluded or included no matter what their local ideas were. Multicultural policies and the right of self-determination can be tools of oppression when people are only allowed to become someone which the government defines. “Self-determination” cannot be applied straightforwardly as “rights” when the identity of “self” is contested as in the case of the “Timorese” in the 1970s. It was able to be a legitimizing tool of Indonesian occupation as well as grounds for East Timorese nationalists’ separatist movement.

**Prior to the rise of “diversity”**

From the mid-19th century to the expansion of the Pacific War to Timor Island in 1941—the age of high colonialism—there was no necessity for the Portuguese colonizers to categorize the “Timorese” as “Portuguese.” Instead, the difference between the colonizer and the colonized justified the Portuguese “civilizing mission.” After the demarcation of the territorial border by the beginning of the twentieth century, Portugal’s hypothetical enemies were other European colonial empires rather than Asian nationalists. Due to the weakness of Portugal’s national wealth and human resources, however, the colonial government was unable to impose a strong Europe-centric order in Timor. According to Ricard Roque, their rule in Timor turned into a parasitic indirect administration in which the colonizers were drawn into supposedly “barbarian” local traditions (Roque 2010, ch. 1).
Thus, other European colonizers such as the British and Dutch were looked upon as more progressive models (Castro 1867, book 2).

Furthermore, Portugal’s rule was less intense in comparison to Java and the urban parts of the Philippines under the Dutch and the Spanish respectively. Administratively speaking, the population in Portuguese Timor were divided into the following categories; “European,” “Mestiço (mixed blood),” “Chinese,” “other non-indigenous (e.g., Goan and Africans)” and “native.” The 1950 census, the last Portuguese census along racial lines, indicated that there was a total population of 442,378 in Portuguese Timor, and 434,907 (over 98 per cent) were categorized as “uncivilized natives” while only 1,541 (about 0.0035 per cent) were categorized as “civilized/assimilated natives” (Weatherbee 1966, 684). There were only 568 Europeans and 2022 Mesticos. The more numerous “uncivilized natives” referred to the Timorese population that lived outside of Portuguese education, religion, and language, and apparently, they included migrants from neighboring islands. In 1938, there were 25,202 Catholics—slightly over 2 per cent of the population—in the territory (Belo 2012, 525). Government and church reports viewed most of the Timorese as the Other of the Portuguese/Catholics.

In these conditions, the Portuguese viewed Timor as a “colony,” and the Timorese were merely “natives” or “non-Portuguese.” Thus, Osório de Castro, a Portuguese colonial officer and highly sympathetic anthropologist, unproblematically referred to the Timorese population as “the Indonesians of our territory” in 1928 (Castro 1996, 26). António Mendes Correia, the most influential Portuguese colonial ethnologist in the first half of the 20th century, also insisted that “Timor racially belongs to Indonesia,” and fiercely argued against A. R. Wallace and J. G. Barros e Cunha who associated the Timorese with the Papuan race (Correia 1943, 204). The idea that the Timorese constituted a large Indonesian ethnological family was the dominant view among Portuguese writers. The European Portuguese could claim the status of civilizers by means of European norms. This distinction from “the natives” (the Timorese and Indonesian) legitimized their rule. Although the post-World War II Portuguese regime depicted Portuguese colonialism as a non-racist variation, “race relations in the old Portuguese colonial empire did not invariably present a picture of harmonious integration” (Cummins and Rebelo 2001, 233-246).
Cause and effect of Portuguese multi-racialism in Timor

The treatment of the “natives” in Timor became problematical for the Portuguese because of World War II and the subsequent rise of anti-colonialism. The neutral Portuguese territory was invaded first by the Allied Forces (Australian and Dutch) and later by the Japanese. Although the urban areas were occupied by the Japanese by the end of February 1942, the Portuguese authorities attempted to maintain colonial race relations. Among various scandalous cases, one must include the Portuguese governor’s involvement in gathering comfort women for the Japanese (Carvalho 2004, 224-225). The issue began with two Japanese soldiers’ failed attempt to rape two Eurasian girls. The soldiers were murdered by the girls’ family members. Governor Carvalho concealed the case from the Japanese, reporting that they were “missing,” but simultaneously directed non-European women, who were former prostitutes taking refuge in the interior at the time, to go back to the towns to serve the Japanese: He confessed in his report that he feared that it would be a more severe problem if a European woman was abused by the Japanese. For this act, he received fierce criticism from the European Portuguese women whom he had tried to protect.

The major cause that changed the colonial perception of the Timorese was the two belligerent parties’ war strategies, namely the Australian and Japanese occupiers’ exploitation of the “natives” for war purposes. This indigenization of the war began with the Australian soldiers’ utilization of the local population to conduct guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. The Japanese initially viewed this as against the principle of “Portuguese neutrality” but they eventually organized the remnants of the Timorese rebels against the Portuguese as pro-Japanese forces from September 1942 (Tsuchiya 2017). The Portuguese authorities viewed the Timorese participation in the war as violating “Portuguese neutrality” but the foreign forces took advantage of it partly because the Timorese were categorized as “natives” and not “Portuguese citizens.” In other words, the idea of “neutrality” was not strictly applied to the “natives.”

Although both the Australian and the Japanese forces had no incentive to attack the neutral European Portuguese population, the Timorese rebels and some of the collaborators with the foreign forces
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took advantage of the war-time chaos to fulfill their ancestral revenge against the Portuguese colonizers. The increasing number of pro-Japanese Timorese troops and their unleashed anger forced Governor Carvalho to request Japanese protection in October 1942. From then on, Portuguese citizens lived in concentration camps under the Japanese and “loyal natives.” When the war ended in September 1945, the governor realized that half of the European Portuguese population on the island was dead. The Portuguese survivors’ memories of the period were highly racialized, calling it “Yellow Vomit” and “Black Vicissitude,” referring to the skin-colors of the Japanese and their Timorese collaborators (Brandão 1946, 19; Brito 1977, 58). They learned that they were a small European population surrounded by a vast number of potentially hostile Asian people.

After the war, during a six-year transition period, Portugal changed its official discourse. By 1950, the world surrounding the European Portuguese in Asia and Africa had changed. The former colonial masters in Asia were beginning to leave their colonies. In the neighboring territories of Portuguese Timor and Goa, the new nation-states of Indonesia and India were established: Jawaharlal Nehru and Sukarno emerged as the charismatic leaders of the new age of anti-colonialism, Asian nationalism and the Non-Aligned Movement. What Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar (see this volume) calls “anti-colonial internationalism” was perceived as a serious competing ideology by the remaining Europeans rulers in Asia. The Portuguese in the colonies had to come up with a new idea to justify their rule.

The Portuguese authorities in Timor were quick to start a campaign of multi-racialism in 1945. Although anti-colonial historiography viewed this change as “nominal,” the shift was a genuine reform in many sectors. Timor was the first Portuguese colony where the governor awarded “loyal natives” who had helped the metropolitanos (Portuguese from the Iberian Peninsula) during the war as “genuine Portuguese heroes.” The portrait of D. Aleixo Corte-Real, a Timorese martyr in the battle against the Japanese, was printed on the paper currency in post-war Portuguese Timor. The loyalty that some Timorese demonstrated was unexpected good news for Lisbon. On the other hand, Portuguese censorship hid the experiences of wartime Timorese rebellions against the Portuguese from the general public outside of Timor. Intellectuals in Lisbon praised Timor as an exem-
plary case of non-European “new Portuguese” loyalty to Portugal (Correia 1945, 138-139). To parody Benedict Anderson’s words, the Portuguese authorities in this era were creative enough to imagine the Timorese as their co-patriots (Anderson 2000).

As the rise of anti-colonial sentiment became obvious, Lisbon decided to abandon the use of the word “colony,” and adopted a multi-racialism combined with assimilation as official policy (N.A. 1951, 89-91). This reform was reflected in the constitutional revision in 1951. Previously, the status of the “colonies” was not clarified in the 1933 Portuguese Constitution (Assembleia da República 1933, article 132, etc.). The 1951 revision clarified the status of “Overseas Provinces” (Ultramar) within the Portuguese legal structure as supposedly equal parts of Portugal along with the Iberian metropole (Diário do Governo 1951). Such multi-racialism was inevitable to justify the integrated and indivisible national territory “from Minho to Timor” in this context.¹

This change in the metropole was re-imported to Timor with the emphasis on assimilation. There the assimilation policy took many forms. Prior to direction from the metropole, the colonial authorities enforced the prohibition of the movement of “uncivilized natives” and a semi-forced resettlement of the population in the borderlands to villages prepared by the government (Carvalho 2004, 653). From the 1950s, this was followed by the expansion of Portuguese style education and the endowment of Portuguese citizenship for the Timorese population (Hill 2002, 28-41). These enforcements aimed to reduce the eastern Timorese contact with the Indonesian nationals, lest “our natives” return to their “Indonesian origins.”

The state discourse created a view that the Portuguese had always been supporters of multi-racialism and diversity since the earliest possible West-East encounter. The Minister of the Overseas Provinces at the time insisted that Timor had never been “separated from the destiny of the Nation,” since the first missionary’s visit to the land in 1556 (Boletim Geral do Ultramar XXVIII 1951, 42). Furthermore, Portuguese/Timorese intellectuals favorably compared “Portu-

¹ “Do Minho a Timor” [from Minho to Timor] was an oft-used slogan in the last decades of the Salazar-Caetano Regime to counter nationalist movements in the “Overseas Provinces.”
guese multi-racialism” with German, British and Dutch “segregation” (Correia 1919, ch. 1; Sylvan 1962, 50).

To put this in perspective, the classical British and Dutch indirect rule forced natives to remain natives. However, the post-war Portuguese idea of multi-racialism with cultural assimilation enabled the metropolitanos to culturally discriminate the “natives” while declaring them as equal “Portuguese citizens.” It forced the natives to give up their way of life and accept what metropolitanos considered universal norms. Nonetheless, many of the components were distinctively Portuguese, including the Portuguese language, Catholicism, and Portuguese style education. Only after mastering these, was a Timorese considered a civilizado (civilized) or assimilado (assimilated) distinct from “uncivilized natives.” These assimilated Timorese more or less enjoyed the legal rights of Portuguese citizens and were bound by Portuguese obligations. The existence of loyal assimilados became a symbol of the long Portuguese civilizing project and the natives’ patriotism towards Portugal. From the state’s perspective, the only difference between the metropolitanos and the “civilized natives” was their racial composition, which they tried to obscure through the promotion of multi-racialism. Some of the assimilados did enjoy the best parts of Portuguese multi-racialism such as higher education in the metropole, careers as a literary figures and promotion in the public administration. Most prominent East Timorese public figures from the 1970s to 1990s, such as Mario Carrascalão, Xavier do Amaral, Bishop Carlos Belo, José Ramos-Horta, Abílio Araujo and Xanana Gusmao were products of this civilizing mission under a new name.

However, the Timorese who were categorized as “uncivilized,” and who constantly occupied more than 90 per cent of the indigenous population, remained excluded from the rights and obligations of Portuguese citizens. They were prohibited from moving beyond their districts and subjected to forced labor and corporal punishment for misbehavior (Carvalho 2004, 670-671; Lei n.º 2048 1951). A researcher from Kyoto University observed social-relations in Portuguese Timor in 1961 and obtained the impression that Portuguese rule in Timor was an “outdated colonialism.” (Takahashi 1963, 25-31) Thus, the discourse of the civilizing mission and the invented tradition of Portuguese “humanism” married in the post-war ideology and concealed the continuity of colonial relations.
Portuguese secret documents from the late 1950s to 1960s reveal some unexpected effects of this policy. The archival production in this period was characterized by the horror of the Viqueque Rebellion (a rebellion by Indonesian separatists and inhabitants of Portuguese Timor against the Portuguese authorities in Timor) in 1959. The rebellion led to official hysteria regarding an “Indonesian conspiracy” and Timorese everyday-forms of resistance. It is known today that the participants in the Viqueque Rebellion were the irredentist Indonesian (mostly West Timorese) members of the Permesta Movement, the “civilized natives” in Dili, and the “uncivilized” farmers in the villages of Uato-Lari and Uato Carabau (Taylor 1991; Gunter 2007; Chamberlain 2009). Apparently, the rebellion was a synthesis of several types of social and economic lamentation and the ideology of a “united Timor.”

After the rebellion, the secret police became eager to learn of unexpressed Timorese sentiments. An intelligence agent reported that the salary gap between the metropolitanos and the “civilized natives” was very large and the latter’s salary was barely enough to survive in Dili (PIDE 1960A; 1961). The agent added that, “This circumstance is perfectly unjustifiable.” Secret reports also mentioned everyday violations of the territorial border, the recurrent idea of Pan-Timor-ism and communist propaganda in both Indonesian and Portuguese Timor (PIDE 1960; 1961; Leandre Jan 1970 and Feb 1970). The sentiment of racism-in-reverse too continued to haunt the Portuguese impression of the Timorese.

1974-1975: a conflict of perspectives

If the three decades from 1945 to 1974 were characterized by an official blurring of racial boundaries, the year 1974 marked the return of the (anti-)colonial ideas of European/native distinction in the Portuguese official terminology. At the top level, there was a regime change in Lisbon and the revolutionary military junta in Lisbon accepted the African nationalist view of anti-colonialism. The new regime rejected the image of Portugal as a multi-racial universalist empire. As a result, the government redefined the Overseas Provinces as “colonies,” which were to be “decolonized.”

In Timor, the two Timorese political parties of FRETILIN (East
Timorese nationalists) and APODETI (pro-Indonesian integrationists) expressed legal and cultural separation from the Iberian Peninsula. In other words, although their goals were different, they agreed on the point that the Timorese should be defined as non-Portuguese people. UDT (the supporters of the status-quo), on the other hand, insisted on the maintenance of the post-WWII notion of the Timorese as Portuguese citizens.

At another level, APODETI’s emphasis was to restore one Timor, not two. Contrarily, the UDT and FRETI-LIN agreed that an integration into Indonesia was like “selling one’s own country.” Thus, it was a competition between three overlapping but contradictory imaginings of geo-bodies; 1) UDT’s Eastern Timor as part of Portugal, 2) FRETI-LIN’s East Timor as an independent nation-state, and 3) APODETI’s one united Timor, which could be realized through integration into Indonesia.

Generalization would be dangerous but, arguably, the different ideas of Portuguese-ness and non-Portuguese-ness resulted from the different social relations protagonists experienced. Antonio de Spinola, the leader of the military junta in Lisbon, had experienced long wars against the African nationalists and viewed the situation as an antagonism between the colonizer and the colonized. Like Spinola, many Timorese civilizados were sent to Africa to fight the African separatists, finding themselves acting like mercenaries of the empire: As a result, they viewed Portugal as a colonial empire. Assimilados in the civil service also experienced a lack of economic opportunity even if they had studied and worked as hard as metropolitanos. A few privileged Timorese civilizados, on the other hand, enjoyed the best parts of multi-racial Portugal. For many of the Timorese who were categorized as “uncivilized,” life in post-World War II Timor could be even worse “exclusion” than during the “colonial time.” The matrix below maps out the Portuguese policies and ideologies on the Timorese subject.

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2 The historical sources of the period that I have consulted suggest that in the period from April to September 1974, the three parties were largely independent from external actors. An intensification of external actors’ interference, the adaptation of Cold-War discourses and critical political polarization only developed after ASDT’s organizational change into FRETILIN and APODETI leaders’ official visit to Jakarta in September 1974.
Indonesian occupation and “unity in diversity”

The civil war among the Timorese political parties (August 1975) and the Cold-War conception of East Timor as a potential “Cuba in Southeast Asia” resulted in the Indonesian military invasion of Portuguese Timor at the end of 1975. After this invasion, the Suharto regime justified its intervention as help for the existing political parties that aspired for a united Timor. The cases of massive violence from the civil war in August 1975 to the early years of Indonesian occupation are widely known today. Indonesia, the new occupier of Timor chose largely an assimilation policy. However, in comparison to Portugal, Indonesian imperialism differed in its logic. To borrow Oguma’s argument on modern Asian imperialism, it was a colored empire. Colored empires, from Japan to Indonesia, formed their national identities as victims of European colonialism. Their aggressive actions against neighboring territories were justified as liberation from European colonialism through shared experiences of such victimization. Because of this background, Indonesia could not simply imitate the European colonial narrative since, if they used it, it was easily associated with demonized European colonialism.

3 “Colored empire” is a concept used in Oguma (1998, 661-667) to discuss the commonalities in Japanese, Indonesian, Chinese, Iraqi and Bangladeshi imperialist policy over neighboring territories. He pointed out that colored empires manipulated their identities as victims of European imperialism to conceal their own imperialism over weaker neighbors.
The second disadvantage faced by the Indonesians was that the word “civilization” had been strongly associated with the U.S., and Europe in the twentieth century whereas Indonesia represented the “Third World.” Giving too much emphasis to a “civilizing” project might direct Timorese attention to more “developed” countries. Certainly, the UDT and FRETILIN elites in the 1970s despised Indonesia in comparison to Portugal (even though it was a relatively poor country in Europe) and former British settlements in Asia. Thus the “civilizing project” was replaced by the New Order discourse of economic development (pembangunan ekonomi) and cultural/racial/historical commonalities in Indonesian ideology.

Drawing from Oguma’s concept of the colored empire, we should add that the colored empires in the post-colonial age were required to convince other states that they were “nations” rather than empires. Thus, an alternative to the civilizing narrative could be Indonesianization i.e., assimilation. Like Portuguese post-war assimilation, this narrative contained “you-must-be-like-us” discrimination. But, Indonesia had to face two Others, which were the Western media and East Timorese nationalists. The components of Indonesianization (assimilation) included enforcement of Pancasila, the Indonesian language and education, anti-communism, and an increase in migrants from other islands. Although the Catholic Church rapidly grew under the Indonesian auspices as a state-sanctioned religion, it was critical of certain aspects of Indonesian legal assimilation including the application of birth control, the migration of Muslims and Indonesian language education. Since the assimilados were already Portuguese citizens who abided by Catholicism, these attempts at Indonesianization could not but help produce reactions from former colonizers and the Christian West.

Being a “colored nation-empire” under such constraints, Indonesia had to come up with new conceptual devices. In the end, it relied on two mutually contradictory ideologies. One was what we could term “sameness ideology,” an idea to justify rule based on shared history, race and culture. It was a proposition that Indonesians and Timorese were the “same people,” therefore, they could form a single nation-state. It was best expressed by Djaelani Naro’s words cited at the beginning of this paper. The premise was based on a simplification of historiography and ethnology but even so there were plenty of scholarly works (historians from N. J. Krom to Mohammad Yamin, ethnologists from
Afonso de Castro to Mendes Correia) that grouped the Timorese with the majority of Indonesian people.

This view was furthered in a 1977 Indonesian official booklet entitled “Decolonization in East Timor.” It emphasized the East Timorese people’s “sacred right of self-determination” (Indonesia 1977, 15-16). Then, it supported APODETI as the genuine representatives of “Timor Island” (rather than East Timor), and stated:

the people of Portuguese Timor share the same island with those of Indonesian Timor, the two people share the same ancestry and the same cultural background and the separation of the Timorese into two peoples has only come about as the result of colonial oppression, and does not reflect the existing historical cultural realities. (Indonesia 1977, 13)

The booklet also associated APODETI members with the participants in the 1959 Viqueque Rebellion, and narrated a history of East and West Timorese co-struggle against European rule. The Indonesian amalgamation of East Timor was hence presented as a “Decolonization in East Timor,” a culmination of Indonesian-East Timorese anti-colonial movements.

On the ground, aside from violence, in the administration of the territory massive input was necessary to assimilate the East Timorese, whose major languages and administrative experiences were different from most Indonesians. However, the sameness discourse functioned to hide such difficulties from outside observers. It was assumed, if they were already the same there was no necessity for “assimilation.”

The second ideological device was “unity in diversity,” which was initially a slogan to justify Indonesian rule over the vast and diverse territory including Aceh and Papua. The 1970s was also a golden age of Southeast Asian Studies, and the Indonesian motto of “unity in diversity” was adopted in the scholarly perspective. David Steinberg’s oft-used textbook introduced the subject as follows:

(T)here is wisdom in studying Southeast Asia as a whole, not only because of the insights it offers for the comparative historian but also because, in the words of the motto of the Republic of Indonesia, there is unity in its diversity. (Steinberg 1971, xi)
The existence of a scholarly tradition in such a direction made the Indonesian application of “unity in diversity” to East Timor more advantageous at the time.

“Unity in diversity” was employed mainly against the Timorese “rebels.” It functioned to obscure the historical, cultural and racial differences. The sameness claim was inflexible as its opponents pointed out. Pancasila’s most significant function was to manage the tolerated diversity. If the Timorese nationalists claimed independence based on Catholicism (or their belonging to Papuan race), for example, Indonesia could respond, “Catholicism (or being of the Papuan race) is accepted in Indonesia.” Such tolerance to certain diversity cut down the effectiveness of the separatist claims based on differences.

There was a different emphasis between the state elites in Jakarta and regional integrationists in Timor. Generally, Jakarta emphasized legal assimilation. Sudharmono, the secretary of state in 1974, said, “The possibility of Portuguese Timor’s integration is not closed”, but it is only acceptable if “it is in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, namely the principle of the unitary state” (Tempo 1974). On the other hand, the language of the East Timorese integrationists was characterized by the frequency of the idea of unification with the “Indonesian people in Timor” i.e., the West Timorese (cf. APODETI, UDT, KOTA, Partido Trabalhista 1975). The secretary of APODETI’s idea of Indonesia’s role was as follows:

We are a poor country. We could end up fighting among ourselves. We do not need neo-colonialism, just some control from Indonesia; and if we need some things maybe we can get them from Indonesia. Our customs are the same; only our colonialism is different. We are one country: we are part of all Timor and Timor is in the middle of Indonesia. Even if Indonesia comes you can still have your customs; they will not destroy them. If we are together and you need something you can ask Jakarta for help. And if you want, you can ask Australia for help. But we do not want fighting among the people of one land. (Nicol 1978, 58)

Apparently, the Timorese integrationists expected Indonesia to act as a suzerain who would arbitrate the conflicts among the Timorese population through a kind of indirect rule whereas Jakarta understood it would enforce Javanese direct rule upon East Timor.
If these Indonesian local enforcements were observed as a “policy” it appears to have been a contradictory one without clear objectives. However, it is natural that Indonesianization (assimilation), sameness discourse and “unity in diversity” were contradictory because they were directed at different audiences. Basically, the sameness discourse was formed to justify Indonesian rule in the international community in the post-colonial world, whereas Indonesianization and the “unity in diversity” discourse were to counter East Timorese nationalism. In other words, the local policy was framed by the existences of the two Others. Under this condition, the Timorese became “Indonesian,” “non-Indonesian,” and “enemies of Indonesia.” Thus, along with the massive assimilation attempt, financial input and conversion from “animism” to officially tolerated world religions were strategies of fierce repression of alleged Timorese “communists” including FRETILIN members and the emigration of “Portuguese citizens.”

Revealingly, an incautious local officer referred to the Timorese as “barbarians” (Anderson 2000). The matrix below may indicate this subtle incoherence in the Indonesian conceptualization of the Timorese.

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<th>Policy Types of the Timorese as “Indonesian” and “non-Indonesian”</th>
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<td><strong>Type: Total Assimilation</strong></td>
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<td>2). APODETI (since 1975-)</td>
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<td><strong>Type: Indirect Rule/Multiculturalism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1). Indonesia (Unity in Diversity)</td>
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<td>2). APODETI (until September 1974)</td>
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<td><strong>Cultural Assimilation</strong></td>
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4 James Dunn's report indicates that there were about 1500 Timorese refugees in Portugal in January 1977 (United States. March 23, 1977). Apparently, Indonesia continued to encourage “Portuguese citizens” to “return” in the 1980s (Tapol Bulletin 1987, 21). One “Timorese” interviewee explained that the Indonesian government encouraged the inhabitants with “Portuguese citizenship”, including himself, to move to Portugal.
Resisting “unity in diversity”: FRETILIN’s idea of Timorese-ness and human rights

FRETILIN’s idea of the Timorese race and history was developed as a reaction to Indonesian propaganda. Their leaders attempted to counter the Indonesian ideologies intellectually when they realized the nature of the Indonesian sameness claim. The FRETILIN Central Committee members already agreed, in 1975, to insist to the international audience that East Timor racially belonged to the “Pacific Countries” rather than Indonesia and, by extension, Southeast Asia (Fernandes and Ramos-Horta 1975, 1-2). They utilized the metageographic separation of the Asian and the Pacific regions (originating from the idea of the Wallace Line) and situated themselves in the latter. At the time, however, mainstream area specialists viewed Portuguese Timor as the “last colonial territory in Southeast Asia” (Bastin and Benda 1968, 1). After the Indonesian invasion, some academics in the West began to dissociate East Timor from Indonesia, and connected the Timorese to New Caledonia, Fiji and the Australian aboriginal peoples.

Gradually FRETILIN and their backers perceived the necessity to distinguish the East Timorese from the West Timorese. An oft-quoted comment in this context was Shepard Forman’s testimony in the U.S., Congress (United States 1977). Forman argued that Indonesians were “foreigners” for the East Timorese because they were included in the local category of “malai”, the word of othering applied to Europeans, Japanese and Indonesians alike (United States 1977, 13 and 34). He represented Indonesia as a consequence of post-colonial boundaries but not of ethno-linguistic and cultural unity (United States 1977, 15). Then, he denied the precolonial histories of Javanese/Islamic prin- cipalities’ overlordship of Timor (United States 1977, 15). Regarding the linguistic situations, he denied the affinity between the East Timorese languages and Bahasa Indonesia (although the majority of them are Austronesian languages). Finally, referring to the precolonial polities of Belu and Servião, he insisted that these two precolonial political units corresponded to the post-colonial division on Timor Island and justified East Timor as a nation naturally born out of the preceding Belunese polity. 5

5 This argument is questioned in (Hägerdal 2006) by means of Dutch and Portu-
However, some Western powers supported Suharto and the state elites of the powerful nations (the U.S., Australia and Japan) in the 1970s viewed pro-FRETILIN scholarship as “ideological writings” rather than “objective and neutral” knowledge production. Indonesia was able to silence much of the international audience until the 1980s by means of the “unity in diversity” and “sameness” discourses.

The historians of East Timor generally agree that the exposure of the Santa Cruz Massacre through the Western media in 1991 was the historical turning point for international activism in the cause of independence for East Timor (Fernandes 2011; Gunderson 2015). Putting it in a Mannheimian perspective of ideology, there were at least three global contexts: the collapse of the Cold War ideological rivalry, the rise of human-rights and the human-rights’ marriage to the idea of self-determination of political minorities. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War imagination that East Timor might be a “Cuba of Southeast Asia” and a justification for Indonesian occupation disappeared in the mind of the stakeholders in the more powerful countries. With the emergence of triumphalism, best captured in Francis Fukuyama’s notion of the “end of history,” the dominant perspective shifted towards the binary opposition of liberal democracy and authoritarian rule (Fukuyama 1989). Human-rights emerged as a conceptual tool with which the European liberal democracies could attack authoritarian states. In journalistic reports of China, Myanmar and Indonesia, for instance, the writing from the human-rights perspective was connected to the separatist movements of the political minority groups and peripheral regions such as Tibet, Rohingya, West Papua, Aceh, and East Timor. East Timorese nationalism and international activism for its independence gained momentum by utilizing this change through the repetitive representation of the East Timorese as a “victimized nation.” Earlier pro-FRETILIN scholarship began to be accepted as a more “truthful” scholarly tradition in contrast to Indonesian propaganda.

Although the representation of the East Timorese from the human-rights perspective did include some truth, it also obscured certain aspects of reality. For example, those who represented the entire population of East Timor in the international sphere—notably José Ramos-house sources from 16th to 19th centuries as well as Timorese oral histories.
Horta, Bishop Carlos Belo and Xanana Gusmao—came from a small elite group of families of “assimilated natives” and descendants of Portuguese expatriates. Primarily the “East Timor story” was narrated through these few people’s accounts. The human-rights/East Timorese nationalist perspective produced a view that the East Timorese were non-Indonesian. Notably, West Timorese and East Timorese were imagined as two different nations and were said to have been in a constant state of war since the earliest times, which is not supported by the historical evidence (Hägerdal 2006). Moreover, the writers ignored or even denied the existing biological ties between West and East Timorese populations, especially in the border areas.

It would seem that our relatively rich knowledge of the international relations surrounding East Timor and our poor understanding of island-wide social networks stemmed from ideas such as the ideological marriage between East Timorese nationalism and Western human-rights ideology, which constitutes the contemporary state ideology in post-independence East Timor.

**Conclusion**

Analyzed through the category of ideology, the history of identity politics in East Timor (1940s to 1990s) was characterized by the external state authorities’ employment of a variety of multi-culturalisms to justify their rule. Portuguese multi-racialism and Indonesian “unity in diversity” were distinct types within it. The post-World War II Salazar Regime sought unity in Catholicism, economy and education, and tolerated racial diversity. It did not tolerate nationalism based on geographic regions. On the other hand, the Suharto regime sought unity as “former colonial natives” based on geographic proximity, and anti-communism. The Suharto regime tolerated certain religious and racial varieties but it did not tolerate “communists” and “Portuguese” in Timor.

The separatists who resisted such multicultural ideologies were not from the same group of people. The various dissidents against this “politics of inclusion” used different arguments in relation to the changing state-policy. Some depended on the idea of a united Timor and some others criticized the salary gap between the European Portuguese and so-called “new Portuguese” i.e., former “colonial natives.”
Against Indonesia, East Timorese nationalists emphasized differences with Indonesians but later adopted the human-rights and democratization narrative in which Indonesia was perceived as an undemocratic authoritarian ruler that frequently violated human rights. The emphasis of “difference” was always assumed to be a conceptual tool to justify political separation. Multi-culturalism, on the other hand, was a device to manage such difference, and a useful means of obscuring the existing local discriminations. Under such state ideologies, the dominant groups were officially called subjects as “equal co-nationals,” while institutional discrimination was exercised against those who were supposed to embody diversity.

A comparison of Portuguese multi-racialism and Indonesian multi-culturalism reveals their different conditions in the post-colonial setting. Portuguese multi-racialism in Timor emerged as a result of racism-in-reverse during the Japanese Occupation from 1942 to 1945. After the rise of anti-colonialism in the late 1940s, the European Portuguese rulers had to rely on a multi-racial ideology and cultural assimilation to justify their presence outside Europe. It benefitted a small minority of Timorese “civilizados,” but the majority who were categorized “uncivilized” remained excluded from the fruits of Portuguese multi-racialism.

On the other hand, being a “colored nation-empire,” Indonesia could apply the idea of “Indonesian self-determination” to the case of Portuguese Timor. The category of race and anti-colonialism based on racial differences continued to frame the debate even in 1975. However, Jakarta’s local policies were full of contradictions. Their local rule in Timor was a mixture of certain tolerance of cultural diversity, assimilation attempts and the use of violence. At the same time, they claimed that the Indonesians and East Timorese were one people. The present author argues that such a contradiction was the result of countering two ideological opponents at the same time—the Western media and the East Timorese nationalists.

Under these two multicultural regimes, the Timorese were expected to embody their diversity rather than to be the political majority. Indeed, a certain portion of the population took advantage of this policy, and managed to advance their education and career. On the other hand, the rebellious sentiments of the separatists grew out of the awkward sense of being included, the duress to accept their margin-
ality, pressure to transform themselves to cultural “Portuguese” or “Indonesian,” and humiliation in the face of their earlier orientations. Even the Timorese “assimilados” and “integrationists” had to experience betrayals by the Portuguese and Indonesian governments respectively. The legacy of this top-down policy making lingers in the East and West Timorese political discourses even after the independence of East Timor.

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